CRIMINAL OFFENCES ACT, 1960 (ACT 29) – PART TWO

3rd June 2022

PART TWO – Offences against the Person

CHAPTER ONE – Justifiable Force and Harm

30. Justification for force or harm

(1) For the purposes of this Act, force or harm is justifiable which is used or caused in pursuance of a matter of justification, and within the limits that are provided for in this Chapter.

(2) In the remainder of this Chapter, expressions applying to the use of force apply also to the causing of harm, although force only may be expressly mentioned.

31. Grounds on which force or harm is justified

Force may be justified in the case and in the manner, and subject to the conditions, provided for in this Chapter, on the grounds

(a) of express authority given by an enactment; or

(b) of authority to execute the lawful sentence or order of a Court; or

(d) of an authority to arrest and detain for felony; or

(e) of an authority to arrest, detain, or search a person otherwise than for felony; or

(f) of a necessity for the prevention of or defence against a criminal offence; or

(g) of a necessity for defence of property or possession or for overcoming the obstruction to the exercise of lawful rights; or

(h) of a necessity for preserving order on board a vessel; or

(i) of an authority to correct a child, servant, or other similar person, for misconduct; or

(j) of the consent of the person against whom the force is used.

32. General limits of justifiable force or harm: Although there may exist a matter of justification for its use, force cannot be justified as having been used in pursuance of that matter

(a) which is in excess of the limits prescribed in the section of this Chapter relating to that matter, or

(b) which extends beyond the amount and kind of force reasonably necessary for the purpose for which force is permitted to be used.

33. Use of force under authority of an enactment: A person who is authorised by an enactment to use force may justify the use of necessary force according to the terms and conditions of that authority.

34. Execution of sentence or order of a Court: A person who is authorised to execute a lawful sentence or order of a Court may justify the force mentioned in the sentence or order.

35. Use of force for preservation of order: A person who is authorised as a peace officer, or in a judicial or an official capacity, to keep the peace or preserve order at any place, or to remove or exclude a person from a place, or to sue force for a similar purpose, may justify the execution of that authority by a necessary force.

36. Use of force for arrest, detention or recapture

(1) A person who by law may, with or without a warrant or any other legal process, arrest and detain another person

(a) may use force which is necessary for the arrest, detention, or recapture of that person, and

(b) may, if the arrest is made in respect of a felony, kill the other person, if the other person cannot by any means otherwise be arrested, detained, or retaken.

(2) Force may be used under subsection (1) only where the other person, having notice or believing in the lawful arrest, avoids arrest by resistance or fight, or escapes or endeavours to escape from custody.

37. Use of force for prevention of, or defence against, criminal offence

For the prevention of, or for personal defence, or the defence of any other person against a criminal offence, or for the suppression or dispersion of a riotous or an unlawful assembly, a person may justify the use of force or harm which is reasonably necessary extending in case of extreme necessity even to killing.

38. Unlawful fights

(1) A force used in an unlawful fight cannot be justified under a provision of this Act.

(2) A fight is an unlawful fight in which a person engages, or maintains, otherwise than solely in pursuance of a matter of justification specified in this Chapter.

39. Use of force for defence of property or possession: A person may justify the use of force for the defence of property or possession, or for overcoming an obstruction to the exercise of a legal right, where

(a) a person in actual possession of a house, land or vessel, or goods, or the servant of that person or any other person authorised by that person, may use force that is reasonably necessary for repelling a person who attempts forcibly and unlawfully to enter the house, land, or vessel, or to take possession of the goods;

(b) a person in actual possession of a house, land or vessel, or the servant of that person or any other person authorised by that person may use force that is reasonably necessary for removing a person who, being in or on the house, land or vessel, and having been lawfully

required to depart from that place refuses to depart;

(c) a person wrongfully takes possession of or detains goods, any other person who, as against the first mentioned person has a present right to the possession of them, may, upon refusal to deliver up the goods on demand, use force, personally or by any other person, as is reasonably necessary for recovering possession of the goods; and

(d) a person may use force that is reasonably necessary for overcoming an obstruction or a resistance to the exercise by that person of a legal right.

40. Use of force for preserving order on board a vessel

(1) The master of a vessel, or a person acting by the order of the master, may justify the use of force against any other person on board the vessel

(a) that is necessary for suppressing a mutiny or disorder on board the vessel, whether among officers, seamen, or passengers, by which the safety of the vessel, or of a person in the vessel or about to enter or quitting it, is likely to be endangered, or

(b) where the master is threatened to be subject to the commands of any other person.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the master or the person acting under the order of the master may kill a person who commits or abets a mutiny or disorder, if the safety of the vessel, or the preservation of a person, cannot by any means be otherwise secured.

41. Use of force for misconduct

(1) A blow or other force may be justified for the purpose of correction, where

(a) a father or mother may correct his or her child,14(14) who is under sixteen years of age, or a guardian, or a person acting as a guardian, the ward, who is under sixteen years of age, for misconduct or disobedience to a lawful command;

(b) a master may correct the servant or apprentice, who is under sixteen years of age, for misconduct or default in the discharge of a duty as a servant or apprentice;

(d) a father or mother or guardian, or a person acting as a guardian of a child may delegate to any other person whom any of them entrusts, permanently or temporarily, with the governance or custody of the child or ward the authority of any of them for correction, including the power to determine in what cases correction ought to be inflicted; and the delegation shall be presumed, except where it is expressly withheld, in the case of a schoolmaster, or a person acting as a schoolmaster, in respect of a child or ward;

(e) a person who is authorised to inflict correction as in this section mentioned may, in a particular case delegate to a fit person the infliction of the correction.

(2) A correction cannot be justified which is unreasonable in kind or in degree considering the age and physical and mental condition of the person on whom it is inflicted.

(3) A correction cannot be justified in the case of a person who, by reason of tender years or otherwise, is incapable of understanding the purpose for which it is inflicted.

42. Use of force in case of consent: The use of force against a person may be justified on the ground of consent, but

(a) the killing of a person cannot be justified on the ground of consent;

(b) a wound or grievous harm cannot be justified on the grounds of consent, unless the consent is given, and the wound or harm is caused, in good faith, for the purposes or in the course of medical or surgical treatment;

(c) consent to the use of force for the purpose of medical or surgical treatment does not extend to an improper or a negligent treatment;

(d) consent to the use of force against a person for purposes of medical or surgical treatment, or otherwise for the benefit of that person may be given against the will of that person by the father or mother or guardian or a person acting as the guardian, if that person is under eighteen years of age, or by a person lawfully having the custody of that person if that person is insane or is a prisoner in a prison or reformatory, and, when so given, cannot be revoked by that person;

(e) where a person is intoxicated or insensible, or is from a cause unable to give or withhold consent, force is justifiable which is used, in good faith and without negligence, for the purposes of medical or surgical treatment or otherwise for the benefit of that person, unless a person authorised by that person or by law to give or refuse consent dissents from the use of that force;

(f) a party to a fight, whether lawful or unlawful, cannot justify, on the grounds of the consent of another party, force which that party uses with intent to cause harm to the other party;

(g) a person may revoke a consent which that party has given to the use of force against that person, and the consent when so revoked shall not have effect or justify force.16(16)

43. Use of force against a third person: A person who, in justifiably using force against another person, is obstructed or resisted by a third person, may use force against the third person, that is reasonably necessary for overcoming the obstruction or resistance; and may, if the obstruction or resistance amounts to a criminal offence or to abetment of a criminal offence, use force in accordance with this Chapter with respect to the use of force in case of necessity for preventing a criminal offence.

44. Use of additional force for exercise of justifiable force: A person who is authorised to use force of a particular kind against a person may further use an additional force, where it is reasonably necessary for the execution of the authority.

45. Justification of person aiding another person in use of justifiable force: A person who aids another person in a justifiable use of force is justified to the same extent and under the conditions that the other person is justified.

CHAPTER TWO – Murder and Similar Offences

Murder and Manslaughter

46. Murder: A person who commits murder is liable to suffer death.

47. Definition of murder: A person who intentionally causes the death of another person by an unlawful harm commits murder, unless the murder is reduced to manslaughter by reason of an extreme provocation, or any other matter of partial excuse, as is mentioned in section 52.

48. Attempt to commit murder: A person who attempts to commit murder commits a first degree felony.

49. Attempt to commit murder by convict: A person who, being under sentence of imprisonment for three years or more, attempts to commit murder is liable to suffer death.

49A. Genocide

(1) A person who commits genocide is liable on conviction to be sentenced to death.

(2) A person commits genocide where, with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, any national, ethical, racial or religious group, that person

(a) kills members of the group;

(b) causes serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) deliberately inflicts on the group conditions of life calculated to bring its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) forcibly transfers children of the group to another group.17(17)

50. Manslaughter: A person who commits manslaughter commits a first degree felony.

51. Definition of manslaughter: A person who causes the death of another person by an unlawful harm commits manslaughter, but if the harm causing the death is caused by negligence that person has not committed manslaughter unless the negligence amount to a reckless disregard for human life.

52. Intentional murder reduced to manslaughter: A person who intentionally causes the death of another person by unlawful harm commits manslaughter, and not murder or attempted murder, if that person

(a) was deprived of the power of self-control by an extreme provocation given by the other person as is mentioned in sections 53, 54, 55 and 56; or

(b) was justified in causing harm to the other person, and, in causing harm in excess of the harm which that person was justified in causing, that person acted from a terror of immediate death or grievous harm that in fact deprived that person for the time being of the power of self-control; or

(c) in causing the death, acted in the belief, in good faith and on reasonable grounds, of being under a legal duty to cause the death or to do the act which that person did; or

(d) being a woman she caused the death of a child, which is a child under the age of twelve months, at a time when the balance of her mind was disturbed because she had not fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent on the birth of the child.

Illustration

Paragraph (c) A soldier is ordered by the commanding officer to fire on a mob, there being no necessity for the order to be given. Here, if the soldier in good faith personally believed to be bound to obey the order, the soldier did not commit murder, but committed manslaughter.

53. Provocation: The following matters may amount to extreme provocation to one person to cause the death of another person, namely,

(a) an unlawful assault and battery committed on the accused person by the other person, in an unlawful fight or otherwise, which is of a kind, in respect of its violence or by reason of accompanying words, gestures, or other circumstances of insult or aggravation, that is likely to deprive a person of ordinary character and in the circumstances in which the accused person was, of the power of self-control;

(b) the assumption by the other person, at the commencement of an unlawful fight, of an attitude manifesting an intention of instantly attacking the accused person with deadly or dangerous means or in a deadly manner;

(c) an act of adultery committed in the view of the accused person with or by the wife or the husband, or the criminal offence of unnatural carnal knowledge committed in the husband’s or wife’s view on the wife, or the husband, or child; and

(d) a violent assault and battery committed in the view or presence of the accused person on the wife, husband, or child, or parent, or on any other person who is in the presence and in the care or charge of the accused person.

54. Exclusion of benefit of provocation

(1) Despite proof on behalf of the accused person of a matter of extreme provocation, the criminal offence shall not be reduced to manslaughter if it appears

(a) that the accused person was not in fact deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation; or

(b) that the accused person acted wholly or partly from a previous intention to cause death or harm, or to engage in an unlawful fight, whether or not the accused person would have acted on that purpose at the time or in the manner in which the accused person did act but for the provocation; or

(c) that, after provocation was given, and before the accused did the act which caused the harm, a time elapsed or circumstances occurred that an ordinary person might have recovered self-control; or

(d) that the accused person acted in a manner, in respect of the instrument or means used or of the cruel or other manner in which it was used, in which an ordinary person would not, under the circumstances, have been likely to act.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), “an ordinary person” means an ordinary person of the community to which the accused belongs.

(3) Where a person, in the course of a fight, uses a deadly or dangerous means against an adversary who has not used or commenced to use a deadly or dangerous means against that person, the accused person shall be presumed to have used the means from a previous intention to cause death, although, before the actual use of the means, the accused person may have received a blow or hurt in the fight that might amount to extreme provocation.

(4) Subsection (3) applies if it appears that the accused person intended or prepared to use those means before the accused person had received a blow or hurt in the fight that might be a sufficient provocation to use means of that kind.

Illustrations

1. Subsection (1) (b) A, who has long been seeking an occasion to fight in a deadly manner with B, kills B. Here, if the jury think that A engineered a situation of being in B’s way for the purpose of taking an opportunity which might occur to fight with B, the criminal offence of A is not reduced to manslaughter by reason of the blow which A received from B.

2. A receives a slight blow from a weaker man, B, and beats and kicks B to death. A’s criminal offence is not reduced to manslaughter.

55. Mistake as to matter of provocation: A lawful blow, arrest or any other violence may be a provocation, despite its lawfulness, if the accused person neither believed, nor, at the time of the act, had reasonable means of knowing or had reasonable ground for supposing that it was lawful.

56. Mistake as to person giving provocation: Where a sufficient provocation is given to the accused person by one person, and the accused person kills another person under the belief, on reasonable grounds, that the provocation was given by that other person, the provocation is admissible for reducing the criminal offence to manslaughter in the same manner as if it had been given by the person killed; but, it is not a provocation to kill a different person.

Suicide and Abortion

57. Abetment of suicide

(1) A person who abets the commission of a suicide commits a first degree felony whether or not the suicide is actually committed.

(2) A person who attempts to commit suicide commits a misdemeanour.

58. Abortion or miscarriage

(1) Subject to subsection (2),

(a) a woman who, with intent to cause abortion or miscarriage, administers to herself or consents to be administered to her a poison, drug or any other noxious thing or uses an instrument or any other means, or

(b) a person who

(I) administers to a woman a poison, drug or any other noxious thing or uses an instrument or any other means with the intent to cause abortion or miscarriage of that woman, whether or not that woman is pregnant or has given her consent,

(ii) induces a woman to cause or consent to causing abortion or miscarriage,

(iii) aids and abets a woman to cause abortion or miscarriage,

(iv) attempts to cause abortion or miscarriage, or

(v) supplies or procures a poison, drug, an instrument or any other thing knowing that it is intended to be used or employed to cause abortion or miscarriage, commits a criminal offence and is liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years.

(2) It is not a criminal offence under subsection (1) if an abortion or a miscarriage is caused in any of the circumstances referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (1) by a registered medical practitioner specialising in gynaecology or any other registered medical practitioner in a Government hospital or in a private hospital or clinic registered under the Private Hospitals and Maternity Homes Act, 1958 (No. 9) or in a place approved for the purpose by legislative instrument made by the Minister,

(a) where the pregnancy is the result of rape, defilement of a female idiot or incest, and the abortion or miscarriage is requested by the victim or her next of kin or the person in loco parent is, if she lacks the capacity to make the request;

(b) where the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman or injury to her physical or mental health, and the woman consents to it or if she lacks the capacity to give the consent it is given on her behalf by her next to kin or the person in loco parentis; or

(c) where there is substantial risk that if the child were born, it may suffer from, or later develop, a serious physical abnormality or disease.

(3) A person who intentionally and unlawfully causes abortion or miscarriage commits a second degree felony.18(18)

(4) For the purposes of this section, “abortion or miscarriage” means the premature expulsion or removal of conception from the uterus or womb before the period of gestation is completed.19(19)

59. Explanation as to causing abortion: Repealed.20(20)

Causing Harm to Child at Birth and Concealment of Birth

60. Causing harm to child at birth: A person who intentionally and unlawfully causes harm to a living child during the time of its birth commits a second degree felony.

61. Explanation as to causing harm to child at birth

(1) Where harm is caused to a child during the time of its birth, or where, on the discovery of the concealed body of the child, harm is found to have been caused to it, the harm shall be presumed to have been caused to the child before its death.

(2) The time of birth includes the whole period from the commencement of labour until the time when the child so becomes a person that it may be murder or manslaughter to cause its death.

62. Concealment of body of child

(1) A person who conceals the body of a child, whether the child was born alive or not, with intent to conceal the fact of its birth, existence or death, or the manner or cause of its death, commits a misdemeanour.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to

(a) the case of a child of less than six months growth before its birth;

(b) the case of intent to conceal the birth, existence or death of a child, or the manner or cause of its death, from a particular person but it is requisite that there should be an intent to conceal the body from persons generally, except persons who abet or consent to the concealment.

(3) Subsection (1) applies to the mother of the child as it applies to any other person.

Illustrations

Subsection (2) (b)

1. A woman conceals from her father or mother the body of her child. She has not committed a concealment of birth unless she intended to conceal it from persons generally.

2. A woman conceals the body of her child from all persons except a nurse who helped her in the concealment. The woman has committed a concealment of birth although she did not conceal it from her a accomplice.

63. Explanation as to concealment of body of child

(1) A secret disposition of the body of a child, whether it is intended to be permanent or not, may be a concealment.

(2) The abandonment of the body of a child in a public place may be a concealment, if the body is abandoned for the purpose of concealing the fact of its birth or existence.

Special Provisions relating to Murder

64. Causing death: The general provisions of Part One with respect to causing an event are, in their application to the causing of death by harm, subject to the following explanations and modifications, namely,

(a) the death of a person is caused by harm, if by reason of the harm, death has happened otherwise or sooner, by however short a time, than it would probably have happened but for the harm;

(b) it is immaterial that the harm would not have caused the person’s death but for the infancy, old age, disease, intoxication, or any other state of body or mind of that person at the time when the harm was caused;

(c) it is immaterial that the harm would not have caused the person’s death but for the refusal or neglect of that person to submit to or seek proper medical or surgical treatment, or but for the negligent or improper conduct or manner of living of that person, or of treating the harm, unless the person so acting was guilty of a wanton or reckless disregard of that person’s own health or condition;

(d) death is caused by harm if the death is caused by the medical or surgical treatment of the harm, unless the treatment is grossly negligent or unless the death could not have been foreseen as a likely consequence of the treatment; and (e) death is not caused by harm unless the death takes place within a year and a day of the harm being caused.

65. Abetment of murder : The general provisions of Part One with respect to abetment are, in their application of the purposes of this Chapter, subject to the special provision, namely, that where a person commands the killing of another person, knowing that the killing will be unlawful, then, although the criminal offence of the person commanded is reduced to manslaughter, or to an attempt to commits manslaughter, by the belief of being under a legal duty to obey the command, the person giving the command commits the same criminal offence as if the person commanded had not personally believed to be under a legal duty to obey the command.

66. Child as the object of murder

(1) In order that a child may be considered a person for the purposes of murder or manslaughter to cause its death, it is necessary that, before its death, the child should have been completely brought forth alive from the body of the mother.

(2) It is not necessary

(a) that a circulation of blood, independent of the mother’s circulation, should have commenced in the child, or

(b) that the child should have breathed, or

(3) It is murder or manslaughter, to cause death to happen to a child after it becomes a person, within the meaning of this section, by means of harm caused to it before it became a person.

67. Medical or surgical treatment

(1) Where a person does an act in good faith, for the purposes of medical or surgical treatment, an intent to cause death shall not be presumed from the fact that the act was or appeared likely to have caused death.

(2) An act which is done, in good faith and without negligence, for the purposes of medical or surgical treatment of a pregnant woman is justifiable, although it causes or is intended to cause abortion or miscarriage, or premature delivery, or the death of the child.

68. Jurisdiction in certain cases of murder: Where harm is unlawfully caused to a person within the jurisdiction of the Court, but the death as a result of the harm, occurs beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, the person who caused or abetted the causing of the harm may be tried and punished under this Act for murder or manslaughter as if the death had occurred within the jurisdiction.

Illustration

A wounds B in Accra. B sails from Accra, and dies of the wounds in Lagos, A is punishable in Accra for the murder or manslaughter.

CHAPTER THREE – Criminal Harm to the Person

69. Causing harm: A person who intentionally and unlawfully causes harm to any other person commits a second degree felony.

69A. Female genital mutilation

(1) Whoever carries out female genital mutilation and excises, infibulates or otherwise mutilates the whole or any part of the labia minora, labia majora and the clitoris of another person commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than five years and not more than ten years.

(2) Whoever participates in or is connected with a ritual or customary activity that subjects a person to female genital mutilation commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than five years and not more than ten years.

(3) For the purposes of this section “excise” means to remove the prepuce, the clitoris and all or part of the labia minora; “infibulate” includes excision and the additional removal of external genitalia and stitching or narrowing of the vaginal opening; “mutilate” includes any other injury caused to the female genital organ for cultural or other non-therapeutic reasons; “concerned with” means

(a) to send to, take to, consent to the taking to or receive at any place, any person for the performance of female genital mutilation; or

(b) to enter into an agreement whether written or oral to subject any of the parties to the agreement or any other person to the performance of female genital mutilation.21(21)

70. Use of offensive weapon: A person who intentionally and unlawfully causes harm to any other person by the use of an offensive weapon commits a first degree felony.

71. Exposing child to danger

(1) A person commits a misdemeanour who unlawfully

(a) exposes a child to danger or abandons a child under twelve years; or

(b) exposes a physically or mentally handicapped child to danger or abandons a physically or mentally handicapped child in a manner that is likely to cause harm to the child.22(22)

(2) Except as otherwise provided, for purposes of this Chapter, a child is a person under the age of eighteen years.

72. Negligently causing harm: A person who negligently and unlawfully causes harm to any other person commits a misdemeanour.

73. Dangerous thing, negligently causing harm or danger

A person who (a) being solely or partly in charge of a steam-engine, machinery, ship, boat, or dangerous thing or matter of any kind, or

(b) having undertaken or being engaged in medical or surgical treatment of a person, or (c) having undertaken or being engaged in the dispensing supplying, selling, administering, or giving away of a medicine or a poisonous or dangerous matter, negligently endangers the life of any other person, commits a misdemeanour.

74. Threat of harm: A person who threatens any other person with unlawful harm, with intent to put that person in fear of unlawful harm commits a misdemeanour.

75. Threat of death: A person who threatens any other person with death, with intent to put that person in fear of death, commits a second degree felony.

76. Definition of unlawful harm: Harm is unlawful which is intentionally or negligently caused without any of the justifications mentioned in Chapter One of this Part.

77. Explanation as to causing harm by omission: A person causes harm by an omission, within the meaning of this Act, if harm is caused by that person’s omission to perform a duty for preventing harm as mentioned in section 78, and not in any other case.

78. Duty to prevent harm to another person: A person is under a duty for preventing harm to another person

(a) if the first mentioned person is under a duty, as mentioned in section 79, to supply a person with the necessaries of health and life; or

(b) if the first mentioned person is otherwise under a duty, by virtue of an enactment, or by virtue of an office or employment, or by virtue of a lawful order of a Court or person, or by virtue of an agreement or undertaking, to do an act for the purpose of averting harm from a person, whether ascertained or unascertained.

79. Duty to give access to the necessaries of health and life

(1) Where there is a duty to give access to the necessaries of health and life,

(a) a spouse is under a duty to give access to the necessaries of health and life to the other spouse who is actually under the control of that spouse;

(b) a parent is under a duty to give access to the necessaries of health and life to the parent’s child actually under the control of the parent, which child is not of an age and capacity as to be able to obtain those necessaries;

(c) a guardian of a child is under a duty to give access to the necessaries of health and life to the child actually under the control of the guardian.23(23)

(2) A woman, who is delivered of a child,24(24)

(a) is under a duty, so far as she is able, to summon assistance and to do any other act necessary and reasonable for preserving the child from harm by exposure, exhaustion, or otherwise by reason of its condition as a newly-born child;

(b) is under a duty, so far as she is able, to support and take reasonable care of the child, which is under her control or in her care or charge, until it can safely be weaned.

(3) A person who, by virtue of office as a gaoler, relieving officer, or otherwise, or by reason of the provisions of an enactment is bound to supply any of the necessaries of health and life to a person, is under a duty to supply them accordingly.

(4) A person who wrongfully imprisons another person is under a duty to supply that other person with the necessaries of health and life.

(5) A person who has agreed or undertaken to supply any of the necessaries of health and life to another person whether that other person is a servant, an apprentice or otherwise is under a duty to supply them accordingly.

(6) Where a person under a duty expressed in this section has not the means of discharging the duty, and there is another person or public authority bound to furnish that person with the means, that person is under a duty to take reasonable steps for obtaining the means from that other person or authority.

(7) Where a person, under a duty to supply any of the necessaries of health and life to another person, lawfully charges the wife, servant of that person, or any other person with the supply of those necessaries, and furnishes the means for that purpose, the wife, servant, or other person so charged is under a duty to supply them accordingly.

(8) For the purposes of this section, “necessaries of health and life” includes proper food, clothing, shelter, warmth, medical or surgical treatment, and any other matter which is reasonably necessary for the preservation of the health and life of a person.

Illustration

Subsection (6) The father or mother of a child who does not have the means of providing the child with food or medical attendance, is bound to seek assistance from an officer appointed to relieve the poor, but is not bound to beg from private charity.

80. Explanation as to office

(1) Where, under section 78 or 79, a duty is constituted by an office, employment, agreement, or undertaking, the duty is sufficiently constituted in the case of a person

(a) who is actually discharging the duties belonging to that office or employment, or

(b) who is acting as if under that agreement or undertaking with respect to another person.

(2) A person is not excused from liability for failure to discharge a duty within the meaning of section 78 or 79 on the grounds that another person is also under the same duty, whether jointly or independently and whether on the same or on a different ground.

Illustrations

Subsection (1)

1. A deputy gaoler, even though unlawfully appointed, is under the duties of a gaoler in relation to the prisoner.

2. A master is under the duties of a master in relation to the apprentice, even though the articles of apprenticeship are void.

81. Exceptions to causing an event: The general provisions of Part One with respect to causing an event are, in their application to the matters of this Chapter, subject to the following explanations and modifications, namely,

(a) a person has not caused harm to another person by omitting to supply the other person with the necessaries of health and life, unless it is proved against that person that the other person, by reason of age or physical or mental state, or by reason of control by the accused person, could not by reasonable exertion have avoided the harm;

(b) the disease or disorder which a person suffers as the inward effect of grief, terror, or any other emotion is not harm caused by another person, although the grief, terror, or emotion has been caused by that other person whether with intent to cause harm or otherwise;

(c) the harm which a person suffers by execution of a sentence of a Court in consequences of a prosecution instituted, prosecuted, or procured, or of evidence given or procured to be given, by another person, whether in good faith or not, is caused by that other person; and

(d) except as in this section expressly provided, a person is not excused from liability to punishment for causing harm to another person, on the grounds that the other person personally, by trespass, negligence, act, or omission, contributed to causing the harm.

82. Special provision as to medical or surgical treatment

A person who in good faith, for the purposes of medical or surgical treatment, intentionally causes harm to another person which, in the exercise of reasonable skill and care according to the circumstances of the case, is or ought to have known to be plainly improper, is liable to punishment as if the harm had been caused negligently, within the meaning of this Act, and not otherwise.

Illustration

A surgeon, through gross negligence, amputates a limb where the necessity to amputate did not arise. The surgeon is not liable to be convicted of having intentionally and unlawfully caused harm, but is liable to be convicted of having negligently and unlawfully caused harm.

83. Causing harm by hindering escape from wreck: A person who intentionally hinders any other person from escaping from a wrecked vessel, or from lawful personal protection or from any other person against harm has, for the purposes of this Act, intentionally caused the harm which happens to that other person by reason of the hindrance.

CHAPTER FOUR – Assault and Similar Offences

84. Assault: A person who unlawfully assaults another person commits a misdemeanour.

85. Different kinds of assault

(1) For the purposes of section 84, “assaults” includes

(a) assault and battery,

(b) assault without actual battery, and

(2) An assault is unlawful unless it is justified on one of the grounds mentioned in Chapter One of this Part.

86. Assault and battery

(1) A person makes an assault and battery on another person, if without the other person’s consent, and with the intention of causing harm, pain, or fear, or annoyance to the other person, or of exciting the other person to anger, that person forcibly touches the other person.

(2) The application of subsection (1) is subject to the following provisions:

(a) where the consent of the other person to be forcibly touched has been obtained by deceit, it suffices with respect to intention that the touch is intended to be a touch that is likely to cause harm or pain, or is intended to be a touch that, but for the consent obtained by the deceit, would have been likely to cause harm, pain, fear or annoyance, or to excite anger;

(b) where the proper person is insensible, unconscious, or insane, or is, by reason of infancy or any other circumstance, unable to give or refuse consent, it suffices, with respect to intention,

(i) that the touch is intended to cause harm, pain, fear or annoyance, or

(ii) that the touch is intended to be a touch that would be likely to cause harm, pain, fear, or annoyance to, or to excite the other person’s anger, if that person were able to give or refuse consent, and were not consenting;

(c) the slightest actual touch suffices for an assault and a battery, if the intention is an intention as is required by this section;

(d) a person is touched, within the meaning of this section, if the body is touched, or if the clothes or any other thing in contact with the body or with the clothes on the body are or is touched, although the body is not actually touched; and

(e) for the purpose of this section, with respect to intention to cause harm, pain, fear or annoyance, it is immaterial whether the intention is to cause the harm, pain, fear, or annoyance by the force or manner of the touch itself or to forcibly expose the person, or cause that person to be exposed, to harm, pain, fear, or annoyance from any other cause.

Illustrations

Subsection (1)

1. A strikes B, or spits upon B, or causes a dog to bite B, or in any manner causes B to fall or be thrown on the ground. Here, if A’s intention was to cause harm, pain, fear or annoyance to B, or to excite B’s anger, A commits an assault and battery;

2. A puts A’s hand on B’s shoulder in order to attract the attention of B, but does not use unnecessary force. A has not committed an assault and battery.

Subsection (2)

1. A under false pretence of surgical treatment induces B to consent to harm or pain. A commits and assault and battery;

2. A kicks B, who is insensible. A commits an assault and battery even though the kick does not cause pain to be felt by B on B recovering sensibility;

3. A pushes B so as to cause B to fall into water. A commits an assault and battery although the push is so slight as not of itself to be material.

87. Assault without actual battery

(1) A person makes an assault without actual battery on another person, if by an act apparently done in commencement of an assault and battery, the person intentionally puts the other person in fear of an instant assault and battery.

(2) The application of subsection (1) is subject to the following provisions;

(a) it is not necessary that an actual assault and battery should be intended, or that the instruments or means by which the assault and battery is apparently intended to be made should be, or should by the person using them be believed to be, of a kind or in a condition that an assault and battery could be made by means of them;

(b) a person can make an assault, within the meaning of this section, by moving, or causing a person, an animal, or a matter to move, towards another person, although that person or the other person, animal, or matter, is not yet within a distance from the other person that an assault and battery can be made; and

(c) an assault can be made on a person, within the meaning of this section, although that person can avoid actual assault and battery by retreating, or by consenting to do, or to abstain from doing, an act.

Illustrations

Subsection (2)

1. A points a pistol at B in a manner that gives B reasonable grounds for fearing that B will be immediately shot. Here, A commits an assault, although A does not intend to fire, and although the pistol is not loaded, and although A knows that it is not loaded;

2. A at a distance of ten yards from B runs at B with apparent intention of striking B and intending to put B in fear of an immediate beating. Here, A commits an assault, although A never comes within actual reach of B;

3. A being near B, lifts a stick and threatens at once to strike B, unless B immediately apologises. Here A has committed an assault.

88. Definition of, and provisions relating to, imprisonment

(1) A person imprisons another person if, intentionally and without the other person’s consent, that person detains the other person in a particular place, of whatever extent or character and whether enclosed or not, or compels the other person to move to or be carried in a particular direction.

(2) The application of subsection (1) is subject to the following provision, namely, that the detention or compulsion may be constituted, within the meaning of this section,

(a) by force or by a physical obstruction to a person’s escape, or

(b) by creating the belief that the other person cannot depart from a place, or refuse to move or be carried in a particular direction, without overcoming force or incurring danger or harm, pain or annoyance, or

(d) by creating the belief to the other person of immediate imprisonment if the other person does not consent to do, or to abstain from doing, an act.

Illustrations

1. A detains B on board a ship. Here, A imprisons, B although B is let free within the ship; and, if B was prevented from leaving the ship until she sailed, B, is imprisoned so long as B necessarily or reasonably continues on board the ship, even though during a part of the time B would have been free if there had been a means of leaving;

2. A, by falsely pretending that B is under arrest, prevents B from leaving B’s own house. Here, A imprisons B.

88A. Cruel practices in relation to bereaved spouses

(1) A person who compels a bereaved spouse or a relative of the spouse to undergo a custom or practice that is cruel in nature commits a misdemeanour.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a custom or practice is cruel in nature if it constitutes an assault within the meaning of sections 85, 86, 87 and 88.25(25)

CHAPTER FIVE – Kidnapping, Abduction, and Similar Offences

89. Kidnapping: A person who kidnaps another person commits a second degree felony.

90. Definition of kidnapping: A person commits the criminal offence of kidnapping

(a) who unlawfully imprisons any other person, and takes that other person out of the jurisdiction of the Court, without the consent of the other person;

(b) who unlawfully imprisons any other person within the jurisdiction of the Court, in a manner that prevents the other person from applying to a Court for release or from discovering to any other person the place of the imprisonment, or in a manner that prevents a person entitled to have access from discovering the place where the other person is imprisoned.

91. Abduction of child under eighteen: A person who abducts a child under eighteen years of age commits a misdemeanour.26(26)

92. Definition of abduction

(1) A person commits the criminal offence of abduction of a child who with intent to deprive a person entitled to the possession or control of the child or with intent to cause the child to be carnally known or unnaturally carnally known by any other person

(a) unlawfully takes the child from the lawful possession, care or charge of a person, or

(b) detains the child and prevents the child from returning to the lawful possession, care or charge of a person.27(27)

(2) The possession, control, care or charge of a child by a parent, guardian, or any other person continues although the child is absent from actual possession, control, care, or charge, if the absence is for a special purpose only, and is not intended by the parent, guardian, or the other person to exclude or determine the possession, control, care, or charge for the time being.

(3) A person does not commit the criminal offence of abduction by taking or detaining a child unless that person knew, or had grounds for believing that the child was in the possession, control, care, or charge of another person.

93. Child stealing: A person who steals a person under fourteen years of age, whether with or without consent, commits a second degree felony.

94. Definition of child stealing

(1) A person steals another person if the first mentioned person unlawfully takes or detains the other person with intent to deprive the other person of the possession or control to which any person is entitled, or with intent to steal anything on or about the body of, or with intent to cause harm to, that other person.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), it is not necessary to prove that the person stolen had been taken from the possession, care, or charge of a person, if it is shown that some person, other than the accused person, was entitled to the control or possession of the person stolen.

95. Special provisions as to child stealing and abduction

(1) For the purposes of the sections of this Chapter relating to child stealing and abduction,

(a) it is not necessary that the taking or detaining should be without the consent of the person taken or detained, and it suffices if that person is persuaded, aided, or encouraged to depart or not to return;

(b) it is not necessary that there should be an intent permanently to deprive a person of the possession or control of the person taken or detained;

(c) a taking or detention is unlawful unless a person entitled to give consent to the taking or detention of the person taken or detained, for the purposes for which that person is taken or detained, gives consent to the taking or detention for those purposes;

(d) a person having the temporary possession, care or charge of another person for a special purpose, as the attendant, employer, or school master of that person, or in any other capacity, can commit stealing or abduction of that person by acts which the first mentioned person is not entitled to do for the special purpose, and cannot give consent to an act by another person which would be inconsistent with the special purpose; and

(e) notwithstanding the general provisions of Part One of this Act with respect to mistake of law, a person does not commit the criminal offence of stealing or of abduction of another person by anything which that person does in the bona fide belief of being entitled by law as a parent or guardian, or by virtue of any other legal right, to take or detain the other person for the purposes of the taking or detention.

(2) Paragraph (e) of subsection (1) does not exempt a person from liability to punishment on the plea that that person did not know or believe, or had not the means of knowing that the age of the other person was under fourteen or eighteen years; nor exempt a person from liability to punishment as for stealing or abduction if that person took or detained the other person for an immoral purpose.28(28)

Illustration

Paragraph (e) A mother, believing in good faith that she has right to the custody of her child in pursuance of an agreement with the father, takes it away from the father. The mother has not committed the criminal offence of abduction, although the agreement is invalid.

96. Abandonment of infant: A person who is bound by law, or by virtue of an agreement or employment, to keep charge of or to maintain a child under five years of age, or who is unlawfully in possession of a child, abandons the child by leaving it at a hospital, or at the house of any other person or in any other manner, commits a misdemeanour.

CHAPTER SIX – Sexual Offences 29(29)

97. Rape: A person who commits rape commits a first-degree felony and is liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment of not less than five years and not more than twenty-five years.

98. Definition of rape: Rape is the carnal knowledge of a female of not less that sixteen years without her consent.

99. Evidence of carnal knowledge: Where, on the trial of a person for a criminal offence punishable under this Act, it is necessary to prove carnal knowledge or unnatural carnal knowledge, the carnal knowledge or unnatural carnal knowledge is complete on proof of the least degree of penetration.

100. Effect of void or voidable marriage with respect to consent: Where a female is compelled to marry another person by duress as to make the marriage void or voidable, the marriage does not have effect for the purpose of Part One of this Act with respect to consent.

101. Defilement of child under sixteen years of age

(1) For the purposes of this Act, defilement is the natural or unnatural carnal knowledge of a child under sixteen years of age.

(2) A person who naturally or unnaturally carnally knows a child under sixteen years of age, whether with or without the consent of the child, commits a criminal offence and is liable on summary conviction to a term of imprisonment of not less that seven years and not more than twenty-five years.

102. Carnal knowledge: A person who has carnal knowledge or has unnatural carnal knowledge of an idiot, imbecile or a mental patient in or under the care of a mental hospital whether with or without the consent of that other person, in circumstance which prove that the accused knew at the time of the commission of the criminal offence that the other person has a mental incapacity commits a criminal offence and is liable on summary conviction to a term of imprisonment of not less than five or and not more than twenty-five years.

103. Indecent assault

(1) A person who indecently assaults another person commits a misdemeanour and is liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment of not less than six months.

(2) A person commits the criminal offence of indecent assault if, without the consent of the other person that person

(a) forcibly makes a sexual bodily contact with the other person, or

(b) sexually violates the body of the other person,

in a manner not amounting to carnal knowledge or unnatural carnal knowledge.

104. Unnatural carnal knowledge

(1) A person who has unnatural carnal knowledge

(a) of another person of not less than sixteen years of age without the consent of that other

person commits a first degree felony and is liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment of not less than five years and not more than twenty-five years; or

(b) of another person of not less than sixteen years of age with the consent of that other person commits a misdemeanour; or

(2) Unnatural carnal knowledge is sexual intercourse with a person in an unnatural manner or, with an animal.

105. Incest

(1) A male of not less than sixteen years of age who has carnal knowledge of a female whom he

knows is his grand-daughter, daughter, sister, mother or grandmother commits a criminal offence and is

liable on summary conviction to a term of imprisonment of not less than three years and not more than twenty-five years.

(2) A female of not less than sixteen years or age who has carnal knowledge of a male whom she knows is her grand-son, son, brother, father or grandfather, commits a criminal offence and is liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment of not less than three years and not more than twenty-five years.

(3) A male of not less than sixteen years of age who permits a female whom he knows is his grandmother, mother, sister or daughter to have carnal knowledge of him with his consent, commits a criminal offence and is liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment of not less than three years and not more than twenty-five years.

(4) A female of not less than sixteen years of age who permits a male whom she knows is her grandfather, father, brother or son to have carnal knowledge of her with her consent, commits a criminal offence and is liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment of not less than three years and not more than twenty-five years.

(5) In this section, “sister” includes half-sister, and “brother” includes half-brother, and for the purposes of this section an expression importing a relationship between two people applies although the relationship is not traced through lawful wedlock.

106. Householder permitting defilement of a child

(1) The owner or occupier of premises or a person acting or assisting in the management of the premises who induces or knowingly permits a child of less than sixteen years of age to resort to or be in or on the premises to be carnally known or unnaturally carnally known by any other person, commits a criminal offence and is liable on conviction to a term of imprisonment not less than seven years and not more than twenty-five years.

(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), it is a criminal offence under this section whether the carnal knowledge or unnatural carnal knowledge is intended to be with a particular person or generally.

(3) It is a defence to a charge under this section that the accused person had reasonable cause to believe that the child was of or above sixteen years of age.

107. Procuration

(1) A person commits a misdemeanour who

(a) procures another person under twenty-one years of age, who is not a prostitute or of known immoral character to have carnal or unnatural carnal connection in the Republic or elsewhere with any other person; or

(b) procures another person to become a prostitute in the Republic or elsewhere; or

(c) procures another person to leave the Republic with the intention that the other person becomes an inmate of brothel elsewhere; or

(d) procures another person to leave that other person’s usual place of abode which is not a brothel in the Republic with the intention that the other person becomes an inmate of a brothel in the Republic or elsewhere for prostitution; or

(e) by threats or intimidation procures or attempts to procure another person to have carnal or unnatural carnal connection in the Republic or elsewhere; or

(f) by false pretences or false representations procures another person who is not a prostitute or of known immoral character to have carnal or unnatural carnal connection in the Republic or elsewhere; or

(g) applies, administers to, or causes to be taken by another person, a drug, matter or thing, with intent to stupefy or overpower that other person so as to enable any other person to have a carnal or unnatural carnal connection with that other person.

(2) A person shall not be convicted of a criminal offence under subsection (1) on the evidence of one witness, unless the witness is corroborated in a material particular by evidence implicating the accused person.

108. Seduction or prostitution of a child under sixteen

(1) A person who having the custody, charge or care of a child under the age of sixteen years causes or encourages the seduction, carnal knowledge or unnatural carnal knowledge or prostitution of that child or the commission of indecent assault on that child commits a misdemeanour.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a person causes or encourages the seduction, carnal knowledge or unnatural carnal knowledge, prostitution or commission of indecent assault on a child, if that person knowingly allows the child to consort with, enter or continue in the employment of a prostitute or person of known immoral character.

109. Compulsion of marriage: A person who by duress causes another person to marry against that other person’s will, commit a misdemeanour.

110. Custody of child under sixteen years of age

(1) Where on the trial of a criminal offence under this Chapter it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the seduction or prostitution of a child under sixteen years has been caused, encouraged or favoured by the father, mother, guardian, master or mistress of that child, the Court may divest that person of the authority over the child.

(2) The Court may appoint a person willing to take charge of the child under sixteen to have authority over the child until the child has attained twenty-one years of age or any other age below twenty-one directed by the Court.

(3) The Court may rescind or vary the order of appointment by appointing another person or may vary the order in any other respect.

111. Power to search for child detained for immoral purpose

(1) Where it appears to the Chairman of a Regional Tribunal or a Justice that there is reasonable cause to suspect that a child is detained for immoral purposes by another person in a place within the jurisdiction, the Chairman or Justice may issue a warrant in accordance with subsections (3) and (4).

(2) The Chairman of the Tribunal or the Justice shall act on information supplied on oath by a parent, guardian, or relative of the child or may act on the information of any other person who the Chairman or Justice considers is acting in good faith in the best interests of the child.

(3) The warrant shall authorise the person named in it to search for and when found to take and detain the child in a place of safety until the child can be brought the before the Chairman of the Tribunal or the Justice or any other Tribunal or Justice.

(4) The Chairman of the Tribunal or the Justice before whom the child is brought may order that the child be taken to the parents or guardian or be otherwise dealt with as circumstances permit or require.

(5) The Chairman of the Tribunal or the Justice may, by the same warrant or another warrant, cause a person accused of unlawfully detaining a child to be arrested and brought before the Tribunal or Court or any other Tribunal or Court for legal proceedings and punishment.

(6) A child is detained for immoral purposes if the child is detained to be carnally known or unnaturally carnally known by a particular person or generally and

(a) is under sixteen years of age, or

(b) if not less than sixteen years and under twenty-one years of age, is detained against the will, or the will of the father, mother or any other person who has lawful care or charge of the child.

(7) A person authorised by a warrant under this section to search for a detained child may enter if necessary by force a house, building or any other place mentioned in the warrant and may remove the child.

(8) A warrant issued under this section shall be addressed to and executed by a superior police officer who shall be accompanied by the parent, guardian or relative of the child unless the Chairman of the Tribunal or the Justice otherwise directs.

(9) Where the warrant is issued on the basis of information given by a person acting in good faith in the best interests of the child, that person may accompany the superior police officer to execute the warrant.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Libel30(30)

112. Negligent and intentional libel

(1) Whoever is guilty of negligent libel shall be liable to a fine not exceeding ¢400,000.

(2) Whoever is guilty of intentional libel shall be guilty of misdemeanour.

113. Cases in which a person is guilty of libel: A person is guilty of libel, by print, writing, painting, effigy, or by any means otherwise than solely by

gestures, spoken words, or other grounds, unlawfully publishes any defamatory matter concerning another person, either negligently or with intent to defame that other person.

114. Definition of defamatory matter

(1) Matter is defamatory which imputes to a person any crime, or misconduct in any public office or which is likely to injure him in his occupation, calling or office, or to expose him to general hatred, contempt, or ridicule.

(2) In this section “crime” means a felony or misdemeanour and also any act, wheresoever committed, which if committed by a person within the jurisdiction of the Court, would be a felony or misdemeanour.

115. Definition of publication

(1) A person publishes a libel if he causes the print, writing, painting, effigy, or other means by which the defamatory matter is conveyed, to be so dealt with, either by exhibition, reading, recitation, description, delivery, or otherwise, as that the defamatory meaning thereof becomes known or is likely to become known, to either the person defamed of any other person.

(2) It is not necessary for libel that a defamatory meaning should be directly or completely expressed; and it suffices if such meaning and its application to the person alleged to be defamed, can be collected either from the alleged libel itself or from any extrinsic circumstances, or partly by the one and partly by the other means.

116. Definition of unlawful publication: Any publication of defamatory matter concerning a person is unlawful, within the meaning of this Chapter, unless it is privileged on one of the grounds hereafter mentioned in this Chapter.

117. When publication of defamatory matter is absolutely privileged

(1) The publication of defamatory matter is absolutely privileged, and no person shall under any circumstances be liable to punishment under this Code in respect thereof, in any of the following cases, namely

(a) if the matter is published by the President, a Minister or in any Parliament official document or proceedings; or

(b) if the matter is published in Parliament by the President or a Minister or member of the Parliament; or

(d) if the matter is published concerning a person subject to the discipline of the Armed Forces for the time being, and relates to his conduct as a person subject to that discipline, and is published by some person having authority over him in respect of such conduct, and to some person having authority over him in respect of such conduct; or

(e) if the matter is published by a person acting in any judicial proceeding as a Judge or Magistrate, or as Attorney-General or other public prosecutor, or as a juror or witness; or

(f) if the matter published is in fact a fair report of anything said, done, or published in the Parliament; or

(g) if the person publishing the matter is legally bound to publish it; or

(h) if the matter is true, and if it is found that it was for the public benefit that the matter should be published.

(2) Where a publication is absolutely privileged, it is immaterial for the purposes of this Chapter (notwithstanding any of the general provisions of Part One with respect to justifications or excuses) whether (except as mentioned in paragraph (h) of subsection (1) the matter be true or false, and whether it be or be not known or believed to be false, and whether it be or be not published in good faith.

118. When publication of defamatory matter is conditionally privileged

A publication of defamatory matter is privileged, on condition that it was published in good faith, in any of the following cases, namely

(a) if the matter published in fact a fair report of anything said, done, or shown in a civil or criminal enquiry or proceeding before any Court: Provided that if the Court prohibits the publication of anything said or shown before it, on the ground that it is seditious, immoral, or blasphemous, the publication thereof shall not be privileged; or

(b) if the matter published a copy or reproduction, or in fact a fair abstract, of any matter which has been previously published, and the previous publication of which was or would have been privileged under section 117; or

(c) if the matter is published by a person acting as a legal practitioner in the course of or in preparation for any legal proceeding; or

(d) if the matter is an expression of opinion in good faith as to the conduct of a person in a judicial official, or other public capacity, or as to his personal character so far as it appears in such conduct; or

(e) if the matter is an expression of opinion in good faith as to the conduct of a person in relation to any public question or matter, or as to his personal character so far as it appears in such conduct; or

(f) if the matter is an expression of opinion in good faith as to the conduct of any person as disclosed by evidence given in a public legal proceeding, whether civil or criminal, or as to the conduct of any person as a party, witness, or otherwise in any such proceedings, or as to the character of any person so far as it appears in any such conduct as in this paragraph mentioned; or

(g) if the matter is an expression of opinion in good faith as to the merits of any book, writing, painting, speech, or other work, performance, or act published, or publicly done or made, or submitted by a person to the judgment of the public, or as to the character of the person so far as it appears, therein; or

(h) if the matter is a censure passed by a person on the conduct of another person in any matter in respect of which he had authority, by contrast or otherwise, over the other person, or on the character of the person, or on the character of the other person, so far as it appears in such conduct; or

(I) if the matter is a complaint or accusation made by a person against another person in respect of his conduct in any matter; or in respect of this character so far as it appears in such conduct, to any person having authority, by contract or otherwise over that other person in respect of such conduct or matter, or having by law to enquire into or receive complaints respecting such conduct or matter; or

(j) if the matter is published for the protection of the rights or interests of the person who publishes it, or of the person to whom it is published, or of some person in whom the person to whom it is published is interested.

(2) If it is proved, on behalf of the accused person, that the defamatory matter was published under such circumstances that the publication would have been justified if made in good faith, the publication shall be presumed to have been made in good faith until the contrary is proved, either from the libel itself, or from the evidence given on behalf of the accused person, or from evidence given on the part of the prosecution.

119. Explanation as to good faith

(1) A publication of defamatory matter is not made in good faith by a person, within the meaning of section 118, if

(a) the matter was untrue, and he did not believe it to be true; or

(b) the matter was untrue, and he published it without having taken reasonable care to ascertain whether it was true or false; or

(c) in publishing the matter, he acted with intent to injure the person defamed in a substantially greated degree or substantially otherwise than was reasonably necessary for the interest of the public or for the protection of the private right or interest in respect of which he claims to be privileged.